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Moving Beyond Race: The Joint Committee
on Reconstruction and the Drafting of the
Fourteenth Amendment
by EARL M. MALTZ*
Introduction
Any list of the most significant dates in American constitutional
history must include April 28, 1866. On that day, a majority of the
members of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, which was
considering the measure that was to become the Fourteenth
Amendment, voted to replace a provision that by its terms was
focused solely on racial discrimination with the current language of
section one, which more generally bars states from abridging the
"privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" or
depriving any person of "life, liberty or property without due process
of law" or "equal protection of the laws.'' 1
To illustrate the import of this decision, one need look no further
than the ongoing dispute over the constitutionality of state laws that
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. Thus, in 2003, in
Lawrence v. Texas,2 the Court overruled its 1986 decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick3 and relied on the Due Process Clause in concluding that
the state of Texas could not constitutionally bar people from engaging
in sexual activity with others of the same gender. Subsequently,
relying on both due process and equal protection arguments, a variety
of judges and commentators have argued that the Fourteenth
* Distinguished Professor, Rutgers University School of Law. An earlier version of
this manuscript was presented at a seminar sponsored by the James Madison Program at
Princeton University. The final version reflects the helpful comments made by a number
of the participants in the seminar.
1. BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITITEE OF
FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39th Cong., 1865-1867 106-07 (1914); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
2. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
3. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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Amendment requires state governments to give legal recognition to
marriages between members of the same gender.4 Obviously, if by
their terms, the strictures of section one were limited to racial
discrimination, the Court would have had no plausible basis for its
decision in Lawrence and constitutional challenges to nonracial
limitations on the ability to enter into legally recognized marriages
would be equally unavailing. The decision to adopt race-neutral
language has had equally dramatic implications for the Court's
jurisprudence on issues such as abortion,5 gender discrimination,6
reapportionment,7 criminal procedure,8 and free speech.9
The action of the Joint Committee was in many respects a
personal triumph for Republican Representative John A. Bingham of
Ohio, who was a prominent member of the committee. Bingham-
whom Justice Hugo L. Black famously described as the "Madison of
the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment' 0-was the author of
the language that the committee adopted on April 28th and had
championed the concept of a race-neutral constitutional amendment
throughout the committee's long and tortuous consideration of a
variety of civil rights proposals. Thus, not surprisingly, legal scholars
have devoted considerable time and effort to the task of parsing
Bingham's views on the meaning of the language that was adopted."
But at the same time, an undue emphasis on Bingham's views
can easily distort our view of the dynamic that ultimately produced
the final version of section one. For all of his passion, the choice of
the final wording of section one did not rest with Bingham alone.
Instead, no formulation of either section one in isolation or the
Fourteenth Amendment as a whole could be adopted without the
support of the other mainstream Republicans who served with
Bingham on the Joint Committee. Moreover, only three days before,
4. E.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014); Daniel 0. Conkle, Evolving
Values, Animus, and Same Sex Marriage, 89 IND. L.J. 27 (2014); Heather Gerken, Larry
and Lawrence, 20 TULSA L. REV. 843 (2006).
5. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. E.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
7. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
8. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966).
9. E.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
10. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
11. E.g., GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM
AND THE INVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 108 (2013); Richard L. Aynes,
The Continuing Importance of Congressman John A. Bingham and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 589 (2003).
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a majority of those Republicans had voted to remove Bingham's
language from the Fourteenth Amendment." In addition, they had
unanimously voted to reject Bingham's attempt to have his proposal
reported as a separate constitutional amendment. 3 Bingham was
ultimately successful in having his race-neutral proposal included in
the Fourteenth Amendment only because a number of those who had
opposed him on April 25th supported his effort to change the
language of section one on April 28th. 4 But despite the enormous
historical significance of the change in language, the committee's
motivation for making the change has remained something of a
mystery.15
Seeking to unravel the mystery, this article traces the
development of the Fourteenth Amendment and discuss the forces
that ultimately led to the decision to adopt the current language of
section one. Unlike studies which analyze the legislative history of
section one in isolation or relate the drafting process to the dispute
over the constitutionality the Civil Rights Act of 1866,16 this article
seeks to place the evolution of section one in the larger context of the
political dispute over Reconstruction policy more generally and will
argue that the decision to embrace the race-neutral formulation was
driven primarily by a desire to remove explicit references to race
from the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole. The article concludes
by discussing the implications of this conclusion for efforts to divine
the original meaning of section one.
I. The Problem of Reconstruction1'
The passage of the Fourteenth Amendment was a byproduct of
the struggle over reconstruction that dominated the proceedings of
12. KENDRICK, supra note 1, at 98-99.
13. Id. at 99.
14. Compare id. at 106-107 with id. at 98-99.
15. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 57 (1988) (noting possible explanations).
16. See, e.g., KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2014); RAOUL BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1997).
17. For more detailed discussions of the problem of reconstruction as it was
perceived by the members of the 39th Congress, see, e.g., MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A
COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION,
1863-1869 (1974); JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
3-37 (1958); ERIC L. McKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION (1960).
The discussion in this section is taken primarily from these works.
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the first session of the 39th Congress. Although Congress had been
grappling with the problem of reconstruction for some time prior to
the end of the Civil War,18 the issue took on new urgency after the
surrender of Robert E. Lee at Appomattox on April 9, 1865. With
the collapse of the Confederate war effort, it became clear that the
eleven Southern states whose governments had sought to leave the
Union and form a separate national entity would remain part of the
United States in some form. However, the representatives of the
victorious Northern states were deeply divided over the question of
when and under what circumstances the ex-Confederate states should
be allowed to reacquire the status of equal partners in the Union.
For a significant number of Northerners, the resolution of this
issue posed no difficulties. All parties to the controversy understood
that white Southerners were natural political allies of the Northern
Democrats, many of whom had opposed the prosecution of the Civil
War itself. Thus, not surprisingly, congressional Democrats
consistently argued that the Southern states should immediately
resume control of their local affairs and also be allowed to select
members of both Houses of Congress. In theoretical terms,
Democrats observed that the Civil War had been prosecuted on the
theory that the ex-Confederate states had no right to leave the Union.
Thus, Democrats reasoned, whatever actions individual Southerners
may have taken, the Southern states as corporate entities must be
viewed as having remained in the Union, with the ability to resume
active participation as full partners whenever they so chose.
But whatever the merits of this position in the abstract, in
practical terms, congressional Democrats were in no position to enact
their views into law. Republicans held overwhelming majorities in
both the Senate and the House of Representatives when the Thirty-
Ninth Congress convened in December 1865, and few Republicans
members of Congress were prepared to allow the ex-Confederate
states to completely regain their prewar status without preconditions.
In general terms, these preconditions included repudiation of the
Confederate war debt, security for the fundamental rights of the ex-
slaves who had been freed by the Thirteenth Amendment, and some
adjustment in the political structure. But within these parameters,
Republicans differed sharply among themselves on the precise nature
of the measures that were necessary.
18. See HERMAN BELZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE UNION: THEORY AND POLICY
DURING THE CIVIL WAR (1969) (providing a detailed account of the early disputes over
reconstruction policy).
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The situation was further complicated by uncertainty about the
position of President Andrew Johnson of Tennessee. Johnson, an
erstwhile Jacksonian Democrat, had been chosen as the Republican
Vice Presidential candidate in 1864 in an effort to provide political
balance to the ticket and had succeeded to the presidency after the
assassination of Abraham Lincoln. While Johnson's early actions on
Reconstruction suggested that he was in favor of quickly restoring the
Southern states to their pre-war status, early in the session many
Republicans remained hopeful that they could reach some
accommodation with the President.
Against this backdrop of uncertainty, when the first session of
the 39th Congress convened on December 4, 1865, the
representatives that had been elected from the ex-Confederate states
were present in the chamber. However, by prearrangement, Edward
McPherson, the Clerk of the House, dealt with their presence by
simply omitting their names when he called the roll.'9 Thus,
Republicans remained firmly in control of both houses of Congress.
The House then turned to the more general issue of
reconstruction. The day before, acting on the recommendation of a
committee charged with considering the question, the House
Republican Caucus had endorsed a resolution to establish a joint
committee consisting of nine members of the House and six members
of the Senate that would be charged with the duty to "inquire into the
condition of the States which formed the so-called Confederate States
of America and report whether they or any of them are entitled to be
represented in [Congress.], 20 After some wrangling with the Senate
over the precise wording of the resolution, it was adopted by the
Senate on December 12, 1865.2' The next day, the House concurred
in the Senate amendments, thereby setting the stage for the formation
of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction.22
The members of Congress who were chosen to serve on the Joint
Committee brought with them a wide variety of different perspectives
on the issues related to reconstruction.23 The committee was chaired
by Republican Senator William Pitt Fessenden of Maine, a moderate
19. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3.4 (1865).
20. Id. at 6.
21. Id. at 30.
22. Id. at 30, 46.
23. Short biographical sketches of the Joint Committee members can be found in
JAMES, supra note 17, at 41-45.
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whom one noted scholar has described as "Mr. Republican."24 In
addition, the Republican delegation to the committee included not
only Senator Jacob M. Howard of Michigan and Representatives
Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania and George S. Boutwell of
Massachusetts, all of whom were generally regarded as Radicals, but
also Senator Ira Harris of New York and Representatives Henry T.
Blow of Missouri and Roscoe Conkling of New York, who
represented the more conservative elements of the Republican
mainstream. The Republican Party was also represented by a
number of members whose views defied simple characterization,
including Senators James W. Grimes of Iowa and George H. Williams
of Oregon and Representatives John A. Bingham of Ohio, Justin
Morrill of Vermont and Elihu Washburne of Illinois. Conversely,
Democratic members of the Joint Committee included
Representatives Henry Grider of Kentucky and Andrew J. Rogers of
New Jersey, both of whom were orthodox Democrats, as well as
Senator Reverdy Johnson of Maryland, who was slightly more
flexible than his compatriots from the House of Representatives.
Ultimately, the interaction among the views of these widely disparate
individuals played a major role in producing the basic structure of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
II. Early Actions
The Joint Committee on Reconstruction convened for the first
time on January 9, 1866. In less than a week, a set of subcommittees
had been created to take evidence about the conditions in the
Southern states.5 But even before these subcommittees had been
established, the full committee had begun consideration of a number
of proposed constitutional amendments whose potential impact
extended throughout the nation.
In the abstract, the mandate of the Joint Committee might not
have seemed to be broad enough to cover the proposal of significant
constitutional amendments at all. By the terms of the resolution that
brought it into existence, the committee was not directed to consider
changes in the basic structure of the government of the nation as a
whole, but simply to evaluate the situation in the ex-Confederate
states to determine if Congress should admit the representatives that
had been selected from those states. Thus, one could plausibly have
24. MCKITRICK, supra note 17, at 269.
25. KENDRICK, supra note 1, at 48-49.
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argued that the Judiciary Committees of the House and Senate were
the appropriate bodies for the initial consideration of constitutional
amendments. And indeed, less than a week after the formation of the
Joint Committee, the House Judiciary Committee had reported a
proposed amendment that would have barred the payment of the
Confederate war debt, and that proposal passed the full House with
the necessary two-thirds majority on December 19, 1865.26
But in fact, the Republicans on the Joint Committee viewed
constitutional change as an indispensable element of the
reconstruction process. In particular, it quickly became clear that
Republicans were firmly committed to the idea that the Constitution
should be amended to either mandate the extension of the right to
vote to the ex-slaves or to change the basis of representation in the
House of Representatives in order to reduce the representation of
states that did not allow African-Americans to vote. From a
Republican perspective, such changes were needed to address an
issue that had arisen because of the abolition of slavery.
Prior to the Civil War, antislavery Northerners had often
complained bitterly that the three-fifths clause of Article I, section
two had unfairly inflated Southern representation in the House of
Representatives and thereby contributed to the domination of the
federal government by what was sometimes described as the slave
power.2 However, in this context, the ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment created a quite different problem for Republicans.
Once the erstwhile slaves became free, the Constitution of 1789
required that they be counted fully in the basis of representation. But
at the same time, none of the ex-Confederate states allowed free
African-Americans to vote. Thus, unless the some further action was
taken, freeing the slaves would have had the ironic effect of
substantially increasing the number of representatives chosen by
white Southerners, and thereby increasing the influence of the very
group of people who had led the secession movement. As one
Republican congressman saw it, if the Constitution remained
unchanged, the reward of treason will be an increased representation
in the House, an increased influence in the Government of the
traitors who have sworn and striven to destroy it.28 In addition,
Republicans feared that enhanced Southern representation would
26. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1865).
27. See, e.g., LEONARD L. RICHARDS, THE SLAVE POWER: THE FREE NORTH AND
SOUTHERN DOMINATION, 1780-1860 (2000).
28. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 410 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Cook).
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make it far more likely that a combination of representatives of the
ex-Confederate states and Northern Democrats would be strong
enough to control the national government. 9
Many Republicans believed that the best response to this
situation was to require the enfranchisement of the newly freed
slaves. To be sure, the representation of the Southern states in the
House of Representatives would still be increased. However, if
Southern African-Americans were granted the right to vote,
Republicans hoped that they would exercise their political power to
ensure that at least some of the representatives from the South would
support the Republican cause. In addition, Republicans argued that
enfranchisement of the ex-slaves was necessary in order to provide
them with the political power that was necessary to protect
themselves from hostile state legislation."
Given these considerations, it should not be surprising that there
was widespread support for the concept of African-American suffrage
within the Republican Party. But at the same time, a number of
recent events had also demonstrated that advocacy of African-
American suffrage carried with it substantial political risks. During
the fall of 1865, supporters of African-American suffrage suffered a
number of important defeats in local elections in Northern states.
The most significant setback came in Connecticut, the last New
England state to deny African-Americans the right to vote, where a
measure that would have removed the racial qualification was
defeated in a referendum conducted in October 1865.31 Thus it
appeared that the aggressive promotion of African-American
suffrage had the potential to undermine the political fortunes of the
Republican Party in localities where the electorate was closely-
divided between Republicans and Democrats.
On the other hand, a measure that specifically targeted the basis
of representation held out the possibility of advancing Republican
policy objectives while at the same time avoiding the political dangers
associated with the outright endorsement of African-American
suffrage. Republicans hoped that the desire to avoid of a reduction of
representation in the House of Representatives would induce
Southern state governments to allow the ex-slaves to vote. But in the
event that the state governments continued to restrict the right to
vote to white citizens, Republicans could at least take comfort in the
29. JAMES, supra note 17, at 22.
30. Id. at 11-15; MCKITRICK, supra note 17, at 55-59.
31. JAMES, supra note 17, at 16-17.
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diminution of the political power of the ex-Confederate states in the
House itself.
By contrast, initially at least, Republicans were less enamored by
the idea that the Constitution should be amended to explicitly protect
the freedmen from racial discrimination more generally. To be sure,
mainstream Republicans were united in their belief that the federal
government should take some action to ensure that the ex-slaves were
not denied basic civil rights. But at first, most Republican committee
members apparently believed that the necessary protection was best
provided by the enactment of new federal statutes. And indeed, two
such statutes were introduced on January 5, 1866 by Republican
Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, the chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee.32
The priorities of the Republicans on the Joint Committee
emerged clearly in the committee's early deliberations. On January
9th-the first day on which the committee engaged in substantive
discussions-committee members offered a variety of different
proposals to change the basis of representation, and a number of
other such proposals were put forward on January 12th. January 12th
also saw the introduction of a constitutional amendment that would
have banned racial discrimination in voting rights on account of race
or color,33 as well as a motion by Thaddeus Stevens to require more
generally that "[a]ll laws, both state and national, shall operate
impartially and equally on all persons without regard to race or
color."34 The same day, a subcommittee was appointed to consider all
of the proposals for constitutional amendments.35
On January 16th, the subcommittee submitted a report calling
upon the full committee to choose between two very different
measures, both of which specifically referred to race. One of the
options presented by the subcommittee was to adopt an amendment
that would have banned all racial discrimination in "political or civil
rights or privileges."" However, with three dissents, the full
committee rejected this proposal."8 More than three months would
pass before the committee once again seriously considered the
32. Id. at 78-80.
33. KENDRICK, supra note 1, at 44.
34. Id. at 46.
35. Id. at 46-47.
36. KENDRICK, supra note 1, at 50-51.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 51-52.
Winter 20151 FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
concept of providing an explicit constitutional protection for civil and
political rights.
By contrast, committee Republicans pressed forward with the
idea of changing the basis of representation in the House of
Representatives. They unanimously endorsed a formulation that had
been introduced by Roscoe Conkling on January 12th. 9 Under the
Conkling proposal, both direct taxes and representation were to be
apportioned among the states based on the "whole number of citizens
of the United States in each State" but if a state abridged the right to
vote on the basis of "race, color or creed," no member of the
excluded group would be included in the basis of representation."°
It was against this background that the Joint Committee proposal
came to the floor of the House of Representatives on January 22nd,
1866. Predictably, the proposal faced criticism from a number of
different perspectives. While House Democrats opposed all changes
41in the basis of representation, some Republicans continued to press
for a measure that would have directly enfranchised African-
Americans. Others, such as Republican Representative Robert
Schenck of Ohio, argued that rather than being based on population
per se, the number of representatives to which a state was entitled
should be determined by the number of legal voters in the state.43
Schenck was strenuously opposed by representatives who pointed out
that his formulation would disadvantage states that had a relatively
high percentage of women in their population,4 as well as border
states such as Missouri, where significant numbers of otherwise
eligible voters had been disqualified because they had supported the
Confederacy during the Civil War.45  Ultimately, despite their
differences, Republicans in the House united around the proposal
that had been reported from the Joint Committee, and that measure
passed with the requisite two-thirds majority on January 31, 1866.46
While the House was debating the change in the basis of
representation, the Joint Committee itself was considering another,
39. Id. at 53.
40. Id. at 44.
41. E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 353, 381-82, 388, 435, 450, 453 (1866).
42. Id. at app. 56-58 (remarks of Rep. Julian), 406 (remarks of Rep. Eliot), 407
(remarks of Rep. Pike).
43. Id. at 535.
44. E.g., id. at 404-05.
45. Id. at 535-36.
46. Id. at 538.
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unrelated proposal to expand the power of the federal government.
Republican Representative John A. Bingham had first proposed such
a constitutional amendment on December 6th, 1865, 4" and had
described what he saw as the need for the amendment in a speech on
the House floor on January 9th, 186648 as part of the discussion of the
import of Andrew Johnson's State of the Union message. During this
discussion, Bingham argued that states were already required to
respect the "privileges and immunities" of American citizens by
Article IV, section 2 of the original Constitution, but that prior to the
Civil War the Southern states had often ignored this guarantee. In
specifying the type of abuses that concerned him, Bingham made no
mention of the treatment of slaves or free African-Americans.
Instead, asserting that the Southern states had often ignored their
obligations to Northern whites, Bingham cited the case of Samuel
Hoar, a white citizen of Massachusetts who had been expelled from
South Carolina after going there to launch an assault on the state's
Negro Seaman's Act.49 According to Bingham, the problem was that
the original Constitution had not armed Congress with the authority
to force states to meet their obligations under Article IV. His
proposal was designed to remedy this perceived problem by granting
Congress the power to "secure to all persons ... equal protection in
the rights of life, liberty and property.
50
Most Republican members of the Joint Committee apparently
shared Bingham's view that the Constitution should be amended to
enhance federal authority. On January 16, 1866, the same
subcommittee of the Joint Committee that reported the proposal to
change the basis of representation also reported a measure designed
to expand the authority of Congress to protect individual rights.5 ' At
the time that the subcommittee made its report, the federal power
amendment was not viewed as being in any sense an alternative to a
constitutional amendment that explicitly outlawed discrimination
against the freedmen on the basis of race. Indeed, the subcommittee
recommended that the federal power amendment be adopted even if
the committee also reported a constitutional amendment explicitly
aimed at racial discrimination. 2 Instead, the subcommittee proposal
47. Id. at 14.
48. Id. at 157-58.
49. Id. at 158.
50. Id.
51. KENDRICK, supra note 1, at 51.
52. Id. at 50.
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was clearly designed to give Congress the power to prevent abuses
that did not involve racial discrimination as well.
Like the measure that Bingham had discussed in his January 9th
speech on the floor of the House of Representatives, the
subcommittee formulation also would have armed Congress with the
power to guarantee "equal protection in the rights of life, liberty and
property." But in addition, the subcommittee formulation would
have provided Congress with the power to "secure to all citizens of
the United States, in every state, the same political rights and
privileges."53 If this language had ultimately become a part of the
Constitution, such an amendment would have dramatically altered
the structure of American federalism. By its terms, the amendment
would have vested Congress not only with the authority to protect the
fundamental rights of all persons-white or African-American-but
also to exercise effective control over the structure of the political
process in each state. However, before it was approved by the Joint
Committee as a whole, the language of the proposed congressional
power amendment had been changed significantly.
The discussion of the federal power amendment began on
January 22nd. On that day, after briefly considering and rejecting
two proposed changes in the text, committee members voted to have
the form of the proposal reconsidered by a new subcommittee. 4 Five
days later, this subcommittee issued its report, which proposed that
the Joint Committee endorse a constitutional amendment whose
wording differed slightly from that which had been reported on
January 16th. Rather than empowering Congress to adopt laws
securing "equal protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty and
property," and "the same political rights and privileges," the January
27th formulation would have vested Congress with the authority to
guarantee "full protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty and
property," and also to the citizens of each state "the same immunities
and also equal political rights and privileges."55 Democrat Reverdy
Johnson then moved to delete the last clause. However, with only ten
members present, the motion was defeated, as Johnson was able to
gain the support of only fellow Democrat Henry Grider and
Republicans Ira Harris and Roscoe Conkling of New York, while six
other Republicans were opposed to the change.56 But when Thaddeus
53. Id. at 51.
54. Id. at 55.
55. Id. at 56.
56. Id. at 57.
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Stevens moved to report the proposed amendment to the Senate, his
motion was defeated, as George Boutwell joined those who had
supported Johnson to create a 5-5 tie. 7
Despite this setback, on February 3rd, Bingham pressed for a far
more significant change in the language of the amendment, moving to
eliminate all reference to political rights from the proposal. Instead,
the February 3rd formulation would have vested Congress with the
power to make laws that would be necessary and proper to secure to
the citizens of each state "all privileges and immunities of citizens in
the several states" and to all persons "equal protection in the rights of
life, liberty and property."58
As presented in Bingham's motion, each of the two clauses also
parenthetically referenced parts of the existing Constitution. The
language of Bingham's privileges and immunities clause tracked that
of Article IV, section 2, to which he had referred in his January 9th
speech. By contrast, although the Fifth Amendment does not discuss
the concept of equal protection per se, Bingham cited the Due
Process Clause as the source of the equal protection language in his
proposed amendment. Against this background, by a narrow 7-6
margin with no clear ideological orientation, the committee approved
Bingham's motion to substitute his language for that which it had
considered on January 27th. 9
The conservatives who had formed the core of the resistance six
days earlier were not mollified by the decision to remove the
references to political rights from the proposed constitutional
amendment. Once again, Harris and Conkling joined committee
Democrats in voting against adopting the proposed amendment.
However, George Boutwell now joined all other committee
Republicans in supporting the Bingham proposal, and on February
4th, the committee voted 9-5 to report the proposal to both houses of
Congress.'
However, events soon proved that the misgivings that had led
Harris and Conkling to oppose the Bingham amendment in the Joint
Committees were shared by a significant number of other
Republicans as well. Even before the House began its formal
consideration of the proposal, the Springfield Republican asserted
that it was doubtful that the amendment could gain the necessary
57. Id.
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two-thirds majority because "the people are not likely to give any
such general power to Congress."'" Events soon proved this
assessment to be prescient.
The strength of the opposition became clear during debates on
the House floor on February 26th, 27th, and 28th. Although
Republican Representative Giles Hotchkiss of New York urged an
amendment that would have directly required states to respect
fundamental rights,62 there is no indication that, taken alone, such
objections would have been fatal to the prospects of the Joint
Committee proposal. For example, Thaddeus Stevens, who had
proposed just such an amendment during the Joint Committee
deliberations only the month before, also supported the Bingham
formulation.
By contrast, complaints about the potential impact of the
proposed amendment on the structure of American federalism gained
more traction during the debates. Predictably, Democrat Andrew
Rogers took the floor to condemn any expansion of federal power."
By contrast, Republican foes of the amendment were more selective
in their attacks. These Republicans found no fault with the grant of
authority to secure the privileges and immunities of citizenship. '
Instead, their criticisms were aimed specifically at the equal
protection component of the Bingham proposal.
Some Republicans contended that the amendment would give
Congress the authority to force all states to grants identical
protections to life, liberty and property. However, the main
Republican critique, delivered by Representative Robert S. Hale of
New York took a slightly different tack. Hale asserted that:
The language [of the proposal] in its grammatical and
legal construction.., is a grant of the fullest and most
ample power to Congress to make all laws "necessary
and proper to secure to all persons in the several
States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and
property," with the simple proviso that such protection
shall be equal. It is not a mere provision that when the
States undertake to give protection which is unequal,
Congress may equalize it; it is a grant of power in
61. SPRINGFIELD REPUBLICAN, Jan. 26, 1866, at 2.
62. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866).
63. Id. at app. 133-35.
64. Id. at 1064, 1082, 1095.
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general terms-a grant of the right to legislate for the
protection of life, liberty and property, simply
qualified with the condition that it shall be equal
legislation.65
To illustrate this point, Hale suggested that the committee proposal
would arm Congress with the power to override the property rights of
married women.
The same basic theme was reflected in all of the Republican
denunciations of Bingham's proposal. Even Hotchkiss was uneasy
with the potentially broad scope of the equal protection element of
the Bingham amendment and indicated he favored protecting only a
defined list of fundamental rights. 6 Thus, the key issue in the debate
was whether the proposal would unduly expand the powers of
Congress.
Stevens and Bingham sought to deflect Republican criticisms,
arguing that the powers granted to Congress would be far more
limited than Hale had suggested. 67 Bingham also emphasized what he
saw as the need for his amendment, asserting that the states had
defaulted in their obligation to provide protection of the law for
rights derived from the Constitution, natural law and state law and
declaring that:
The adoption of the proposed amendment will take
from the States no rights that belong to the States.
They elect their legislatures; they enact their laws for
the punishment of crimes against life, liberty or
property; but in the event of the adoption of this
amendment, if they conspire together to enact laws
refusing equal protection to life, liberty or property,
the Congress is thereby vested with power to hold
them to answer before the bar of the nation courts for
the violation of their oaths and of the rights of their
fellow-men.'
But in addition, Bingham reiterated the point that the powers
granted to Congress by the proposed amendment would not be
65. Id. at 1063-64.
66. Id. at 1095.
67. E.g., id. at 1064 (Stevens), 1076 (Rep. Bingham).
68. Id. at 1090.
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limited to the prevention of racial discrimination. When Hale
asserted that "the whole intended practical effect" of the amendment
was to protect ex-slaves from being persecuted by state governments,
Bingham shot back that "it is proposed as well to protect the [many]
loyal white citizens of the United States whose property, by State
legislation, has been wrested from them under confiscation, and
protect them also against banishment."69
Ultimately, however, Bingham and Stevens were unable to unite
the Republican Party behind the proposed constitutional amendment.
The amendment received substantial support from more radical
Republicans. However, a significant number of mainstream
moderates were apparently persuaded by arguments such as Hale's
and opposed Bingham. Thus, for example, Senator William M.
Stewart of Nevada joined Conkling, Hale and Representative
Thomas T. Davis of New York in openly criticizing the committee
formulation.7' In order to avoid outright defeat, on February 28th
Bingham joined in voting to postpone final consideration of his
proposal. Commenting on the result, the Republican asserted that
"no sane man supposes that the states would ratify such an
amendment" and that "the people welcome every indication that
Congress discards this policy and the leaders who urge it." 71
At the same time that the House of Representatives was
considering the Bingham amendment, the Senate was discussing the
proposal to change the basis of representation. On this issue, the
debate over the committee amendment in the Senate featured a
recapitulation of many of the same arguments that had been made on
the House floor.72 However, the amendment ultimately met a
different fate than in the House, largely because a group of radical
Republicans such as Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts
remained steadfastly committed to the idea that the states should be
required to allow African-Americans to vote and refused to support
the proposal to simply change the basis of representation. Thus,
while a narrow majority of the Senate voted in favor of the proposed
constitutional amendment on March 9, supporters fell well short of
69. Id. at 1065.
70. Id. at 1082 (Rep. Stewart), 1095 (Rep. Conkling) (by implication), 1095 (Rep.
Davis).
71. SPRINGFIELD REPUBLICAN, Mar. 2,1866, at 2.
72. These debates are recapitulated in George David Zuckerman, A Consideration of
The History and Current Status of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 FORDHAM
L. REv. 93, 99-101 (1961).
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the two-thirds majority necessary to send the proposal to the states
for ratification.73
In the wake of the rejection of the Joint Committee resolution,
Republicans continued to negotiate among themselves on the
formulation of a measure dealing with the issue of the basis of
representation. They appeared confident that they could craft a
compromise that would attract near-unanimous support from
mainstream Republicans in both houses of Congress.74 But on March
27th, before any such compromise was openly debated in either the
House or the Senate, Johnson's veto of the Civil Rights Bill of 1866
intervened and dramatically changed the political context of the
debate.
IH. The Dispute Over the Civil Rights Bill of 1866
As already noted, the Civil Rights Bill had been introduced in
early January by Republican Senator Lyman Trumbull, the chair of
the Senate Judiciary Committee. As initially considered by the
Senate, the bill declared that African-Americans were citizens,
prohibited racial discrimination in "civil rights or immunities" and
also provided a list of specific rights that were to be equally enjoyed
by "citizens of every race and color, without regard to any condition
of slavery or involuntary servitude." Democrats unanimously
opposed the bill, arguing that the Constitution did not arm Congress
with the power to pass such a measure into law. However,
mainstream Republicans disagreed, citing the Thirteenth
Amendment and the naturalization clause7" as the sources of the
necessary authority, and the bill passed the Senate by a wide margin
on February 2nd. 6
Initially, the Civil Rights Bill encountered more difficulty in the
House of Representatives as a number of conservative mainstream
Republicans including John Bingham joined the Democrats in raising
constitutional objections. In response, the supporters of the bill
made a number of changes designed to address conservative
objections, including the elimination of the reference to the concept
of "civil rights and immunities." Although Bingham remained
73. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1289 (1866).
74. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1866, at 1.
75. E.g., id. at 323 (Thirteenth Amendment), 475 (naturalization power).
76. Id. at 594-607.
77. E.g., id. at 1265, 1267, 1291-92.
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unmoved, the changes gained the support of almost all of the other
mainstream Republicans who had previously voiced concerns, and
the bill was overwhelmingly approved by the House on March 13th."
The Senate quickly adopted the House amendments,79 and the bill
was then sent to President Johnson for his consideration.
All parties to the dispute understood that Johnson's action on
the Civil Rights Bill would be the litmus test of his willingness to
cooperate with mainstream Republicans on the issue of
reconstruction policy more generally. To be sure, a month earlier,
Johnson had vetoed the Freedmen's Bureau Bill-another bill
adopted by Congress that was designed to aid the newly freed
slaves-that had been passed by Congress and seen an effort to
override his veto fail in the Senate." But even in the wake of that
controversy, some party leaders such as Senator John Sherman had
continued to maintain the conviction that mainstream Republicans
might be able to reach an agreement with the President over the
terms of reconstruction."
However, these hopes were dashed on March 27th when
President Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights Bill and issued a harshly
worded veto message that made it clear to mainstream Republicans
that no compromise was possible.82  Although congressional
Republicans in Congress were able to override the veto,' the
realization that the relationship between Johnson and congressional
Republicans was irrevocably broken caused their leaders to rethink
their basic approach to the question of reconstruction more generally.
IV. The Owen Plan and the Drafting of the Fourteenth
Amendment
In the wake of the struggle over the Civil Rights Bill, the
formulation of a coherent position on reconstruction became an even
higher priority for mainstream Republicans. The task of preparing
for the upcoming midterm elections of 1866 was at the heart of the
problem. It was clear to all concerned parties that, in these elections,
78. Id. at 1367.
79. Id. at 1416.
80. Id. at 943.
81. See MCKITRICK, supra note 17, at 298-303.
82. The text of President Johnson's veto message can be found in JAMES D.
RICHARDSON, ED., A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, vol. VIII, 3603-11 (1896-99).
83. CONG. GLOBE 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1809 (Senate), 1861 (House) (1866).
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the question of reconstruction policy would be the central issue in the
campaigns for seats in the House of Representatives. The position of
the Democratic Party on reconstruction had been consistent and
unequivocal-Democrats advocated the restoration of the ex-
Confederate states to full participation in the Union without
preconditions. After his veto of the Freedmen's Bureau and Civil
Rights bills, it had become clear that Andrew Johnson also favored
restoration based on the requirements that he had outlined in his
1865 proclamations. By contrast, Republicans had not articulated any
definitive criteria for readmission of the Southern states; indeed, the
political struggles of early 1866 had only highlighted the deep
divisions within the party over the nature of the requirements to be
imposed. Moreover, even assuming that Republicans could somehow
reach compromises on issues such as those presented by the Bingham
amendment and the amendment dealing with the basis of
representation, passage of piecemeal measures dealing with specific
constitutional issues would not solve the political problem. Instead,
what was needed was agreement on some plan that would provide a
coherent statement of the terms on which Republicans were willing to
allow the ex-Confederate states to resume their status as full partners
in the Union. Samuel Bowles, the influential moderate Republican
editor of the Springfield Republican, aptly summarized the problem
that the party faced:
That part of Congress which is not passionate but
reflective, confronts the fact that it has utterly failed in
dealing with the questions of reconstruction. It has
foundered in technical and theoretical debate for three
months, but has agreed upon no action, formed no
policy, established no terms of reconstruction. It can
go on so no longer. Whether it agrees or disagrees
with the President it must have a policy; it must do
some practical thing.'
By this time, a variety of Republicans seem to have concluded
that whatever else was to be included in the party's blueprint for
reconstruction, a constitutional amendment that guaranteed civil
rights to African-Americans should be one aspect of that plan. Thus,
while Republican Senator William M. Stewart argued that the dual
84. SALT LAKE CITY SEMI WEEKLY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 12, 1866, at col. A.
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principles of universal amnesty and universal suffrage should be the
cornerstone of Reconstruction, he also called for the adoption of an
amendment which would have provided that "no discrimination in
civil rights or disabilities, nor in the exercise of the elective franchise,
shall exist among the population of the United States... on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude., 85  Although
Stewart's proposal quickly lost momentum,86 a plan devised by
Republican activist Robert Dale Owen and brought before the Joint
Committee by Thaddeus Stevens on April 21st initially seemed to
provide a more promising solution to the Republican dilemma.'
As early as 1864, Owen had argued that post-war plans for
reconstruction should be founded not only on the abolition of slavery,
but also on a constitutional amendment which provided that "no
discrimination shall be made, as to the civil or political rights of
persons, because of color."88 The scheme that he put forward on
April, 1866, built on this idea. As initially proposed, the Owen plan
included both a five part constitutional amendment and a bill that
would have provided that once the amendment had become part of
the Constitution, any of the ex-Confederate states that ratified the
amendment would be entitled to regain its status as a full partner in
the Union. With the exception of a provision prohibiting the
payment of the Confederate war debt, the Owen amendment focused
solely on race. Section one of the proposal prohibited racial
discrimination "as to the civil rights of persons," while section two
provided that, after July 4, 1876, qualifications for voting must be
race-blind as well. In addition, section three provided that until that
date, those who were denied the right to vote because of race would
be excluded from the basis of representation. Finally, the proposal
included a section that explicitly armed Congress with the authority
to enforce the strictures of the other provisions of the amendment.
The proposed Owen amendment can be evaluated from a variety
of different perspectives. In structural terms, the amendment was
very unusual, combining a variety of widely disparate concepts in a
single proposal. But at the same time, since each of the first three
85. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1754 (1866).
86. The reaction to Stewart's plan is described in MCKITRICK, supra note 17, at
341-42.
87. The original text of the Owen plan can be found in KENDRICK, supra note 1, at
83-84.
88. ROBERT DALE OWEN, THE WRONG OF SLAVERY, THE RIGHT OF
EMANCIPATION, AND THE FUTURE OF THE AFRICAN RACE IN THE UNITED STATES
197-98 (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1864).
[Vol. 42:2
sections focused specifically on race, the legal import of each of these
sections was unclear only at the margins, as was the prohibition on
the payment of either the Confederate war debt or compensation for
the ex-slaves who had been freed by operation of the Thirteenth
Amendment.
But while all parties to the dispute over reconstruction were
acutely aware of the formal legal ramifications of the Owen
amendment, for mainstream Republicans the proposal was equally
important as a political document. Taken as a whole, the Owen plan
provided the Southern states with a clear explication of the terms
under which Republicans would accede to the restoration of their
status in the Union. Under the plan, Republicans would essentially
have agreed to once again accept the ex-Confederate states as full
partners if and only if the governments of those states publicly
embraced the principles that had formed the basis of the Republican
position on reconstruction since the end of the war itself. While it
was far from clear that the Southern states would be willing to accept
these terms, the Owen plan at least had the potential to provide
Republican candidates with the kind of detailed blueprint for
reconstruction that would be needed to compete effectively in the
upcoming political campaign.
From the time that Thaddeus Stevens introduced the Owen
proposal on April 21st,89 the Republicans on the Joint Committee
remained committed to the idea of using a multifaceted constitutional
amendment as the vehicle for defining the official position of the
party on Reconstruction. Indeed, at one point it appeared that
committee Republicans would be willing to endorse the terms of
Owen's proposed amendment in toto. Ultimately, however, the
formulation reported by the committee diverged from the Owen plan
in a variety of different ways. The changes that were adopted
substantially altered the basic message that was conveyed by the
proposed constitutional amendment.
Taken together, the first three sections of the Owen proposal
that was presented to the committee on April 21st were connected by
a single theme. Although Republicans had significant concerns about
the fate of Southerners who had remained faithful to the Union
during the Civil War, nothing in the amendment that was initially
proposed addressed those concerns directly. Instead, sections one
through three unmistakably conveyed the message that the ex-
89. Id.
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Confederate states would be readmitted to full participation in the
Union if and only if they acceded to the idea that African-Americans
were entitled to constitutional guarantees against unfair treatment by
state governments that might be controlled by their former masters.
By contrast, only one week later, the committee would vote to report
an amendment that did not explicitly refer to race at all.
Initially, much of the debate within the committee focused on the
terms of section one. Although the initial formulation of section one
would clearly have obviated his constitutional objections to the Civil
Rights Bill, John Bingham once again took the lead in pressing his
Republican colleagues to amend this part of the Owen plan to
address other issues in addition to racial discrimination. Despite the
setback that he had suffered in the House of Representatives,
Bingham remained determined to press for a measure that would
address the issues that he had discussed earlier in the session.
However, the form of the proposals that he made during the
deliberations over the Owen plan differed significantly from those
that had been rejected two months before. First, after the earlier
debates, Bingham had concluded that it was not enough to simply
arm Congress with the authority to protect the rights of the citizenry
through legislation. Instead, he now believed that these rights should
be protected by the terms of the Constitution itself, with Congress
being vested with the power to adopt ancillary legislation providing
additional protections.' But in addition, Bingham had also
apparently taken heed of the specifics of the Republican objections to
the earlier proposal that had been discussed on the House floor in
February.
During those debates, the complaints of the Republican critics
had focused on what they saw as the potentially open-ended nature of
congressional authority to guarantee "equal protection in the rights of
life, liberty and property." Bingham continued to press for the
inclusion of equal protection language during the committee
deliberations over the Owen plan. However, rather than "equal
protection in the rights of life, liberty and property," the measures that
he advocated in late April invoked the concept of "equal protection
of the laws."
Bingham began his campaign to amend section one almost
immediately after Stevens introduced the Owen plan on April 21st.
Bingham first proposed to add language to the prohibition on racial
90. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1872).
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discrimination to provide that "nor shall any state deny to any person
within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws, nor take private
property for public use without just compensation."'" This proposal
was rebuffed on a vote of seven to five, gaining the support of only
Thaddeus Stevens and the three committee Democrats in addition to
that of Bingham himselfY With only two Democrats dissenting, the
unaltered text of section one was then approved." This approval
marked the first time in its nearly three months of existence that the
Joint Committee had voted to recommend the adoption of a
constitutional provision that was designed to guarantee civil rights.
But Bingham was not yet ready to give up on his pursuit of a
race-blind provision. After both section one and the other parts of
the Owen amendment were approved over Democratic objections, he
tried again, this time moving to add a new section that embodied the
language of what ultimately became section one, including not only a
guarantee of equal protection of the laws, but also the familiar
prohibitions on the taking of life, liberty or property without due
process of law and abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States. With only Democrats Henry Grider and
Andrew Rogers dissenting, the committee voted to add the second
Bingham proposal to the Owen amendment. 94
When the committee resumed its deliberations on April 23rd, its
attention was focused entirely on the language of the bill that
established the terms for the readmission of the Southern states after
the ratification of the proposed constitutional amendment. By the
end of the session, it appeared that the work on that bill was
completed, and Elihu Washburne moved to report both the bill and
the previously approved amendment to the floor of the House of
Representatives and the Senate. Washburne was supported by John
Bingham and Thaddeus Stevens, as well as Democrat Andrew
Rogers. But instead, the committee voted to adjourn and reconvene
two days later.96
Apparently, the reason that most committee Republicans voted
to adjourn rather than report the constitutional amendment that had
been approved on April 21st and the statute that had been approved
91. KENDRICK, supra note 1, at 85.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 87.
95. Id. at 96-97.
96. Id. at 97.
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on April 23rd was that William Pitt Fessenden had been unable to
attend either meeting due to illness, and that a number of his
colleagues believed that as chair of the committee, Fessenden should
be accorded the opportunity to comment on the Owen proposals
before they were officially approved.97 But in any event, by the time
that the committee members gathered together on the morning of
April 25th, the consensus that committee Republicans appeared to
have achieved on April 21st had been shattered.
Bingham's proposal was the first victim of the renewed conflict
among Republicans on the Joint Committee. By a vote of 7-5, the
committee voted to remove the proposal from the Owen amendment,
as Republicans Jacob Howard, George Williams and George
Boutwell joined Democrat Reverdy Johnson in changing the
positions that they had taken on April 21st.98 Subsequently, Bingham
made an effort to have his amendment reported separately as a
proposed constitutional amendment, but was able to attract the
support of only the three Democrats on the committee.99
In the absence of a record of the discussions of the Joint
Committee, any effort to describe the forces that shaped the vote to
reverse the decision to add the Bingham language to the Owen
amendment would be sheer speculation. By contrast, the explanation
for the voting pattern on Bingham's effort to have his amendment
reported separately is relatively clear. If the Bingham amendment
had been reported separately, some Republicans in the House or the
Senate might have viewed the amendment as a more attractive
alternative to the omnibus Owen proposal and therefore withheld
their support from the Owen proposal, thus depriving that proposal
of the two-third majority necessary for passage. Given what seems to
have been a near obsession with his civil rights amendment, Bingham
was clearly prepared to run this risk. However, the other
Republicans on the committee were understandably unwilling to
cooperate with him.
But in any event, Bingham's proposal was not the major cause of
Republican disunity on the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The debate over his formulation was not discussed in the press, and
Bingham himself voted to approve the amendment even after his
97. TRENTON STATE GAZETTE, Apr. 24, 1866, at 2; Robert Dale Owen, Political
Results From the Varioloid, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Vol. XXXV, 660-70 (June 1875).
98. KENDRICK, supra note 1, at 98.
99. Id.
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defeat on April 25th."°° Instead, the issue of African-American
suffrage was the major point dividing Republicans during the
committee's deliberations over the structure of the proposed
amendment. It was widely reported that at the April 25th meeting,
Thaddeus Stevens and George Boutwell engaged in a heated debate
over the issue, with Stevens vigorously supporting the terms of the
Owen amendment and Boutwell asserting that such a requirement
would find support only in a small number of New England states.
Initially, Stevens' position prevailed. By a narrow margin of 7-6,
the committee voted to report the original Owen amendment to the
House of Representatives and the Senate for action, with Boutwell
joining fellow Republicans Roscoe Conkling, Henry Blow and
committee Democrats in dissent. 2  But almost immediately
thereafter George Williams-one of those who had initially voted to
report the Owen amendment to the House and Senate-moved to
reconsider the vote on the motion to report the amendment. The
motion carried with only Jacob Howard and Thaddeus Stevens in
dissent, and the committee then adjourned and agreed to meet again
three days later. 103
In the interim, Republican frustration over the committee's
inability to produce a Reconstruction plan to counter that which had
been put forth by Andrew Johnson became even more evident. For
example, the Daily Cleveland Herald declared that "it is very
important that [the Republican Reconstruction] policy be a good one,
a just one, a practicable one but it is of the first importance that some
policy be declared. We [would almost say] it were better to declare a
bad policy than declare none at all."'O' Sounding a similar note, on
April 25th, the Albany Evening Journal asserted that "[t]he
reconstruction committee has held this important subject in its hands,
already, too long" and that "each day's delay confers added power on
Northern Democratic conspirators to pervert and mislead the
Southern mind.""0 5 Three days later, the same newspaper insisted that
"[c]ongress should... either demand a speedy and formal report
[from the Joint Committee] or if it cannot be obtained it should take
100. KENDRICK, supra note 1, at 99.
101. SAN FRANCISCO DAILY EVENING BULLETIN, Apr. 27, 1866, at col. G.
102. KENDRICK, supra note 1, at 99.
103. Id. at 100.
104. THE DAILY HERALD (Cleveland, Ohio), Apr. 27, 1866, at col. C.
105. ALBANY EVENING JOURNAL, Apr. 25, 1866, at 2.
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the various subjects referred out of its hands and begin their
settlement in open House."' '
At the same time, it was also becoming increasingly clear that
Republicans could not unite around any proposal that required states
to allow nonwhites to vote. In the evening following the Joint
Committee's meeting on April 25th, the members of the New York
congressional delegation, which included Ira Harris and Roscoe
Conkling, met and were reported to have generally favored a
constitutional amendment that would have simply forbidden the
payment of the Confederate war debt and changed the basis of
representation. The requirement of African-American suffrage was
also purportedly opposed by four of the nine Republican
representatives from Indiana. In short, as one Republican newspaper
put it on April 28th, "[i]t is manifest that no proposition can now pass
Congress which confers suffrage on colored people."'' 7
Faced with these dual imperatives and with Fessenden finally
able to participate, when the Joint Committee reconvened on April
28th, the committee moved swiftly to make substantial changes in the
Owen amendment. With only Jacob Howard and Elihu Washburne
dissenting, the committee voted to delete the provision outlawing
race-based discrimination in voter qualifications.' 8 George Williams
then moved to replace the race-focused provision on the basis of
representation with a formulation that had been proposed by James
W. Grimes soon after the defeat of the original Joint Committee
proposal in the Senate. Rather than specifically targeting race-based
exclusion from voting, under the Grimes proposal the representation
to which a state was entitled would be reduced in proportion to the
percentage of adult males who were denied the right to vote for any
reason other than "participation in rebellion" or "any crime. ' '
Committee Democrats unanimously favored the change, as did
moderate Republicans. Radical Republicans, by contrast were
divided. Ultimately, over the objections of Howard, Washburne and
Stevens, the Williams proposal was adopted on a vote of 12-3.10
While Republicans were hopeful that the change in the formula
for determining representation in Congress would induce the
106. ALBANY EVENING JOURNAL, Apr. 28, 1866, at 1.
107. SAN FRANCISCO DAILY EVENING BULLETIN, Apr. 28, 1866, at col. A; see
generally JAMES, supra note 17; MCKITRICK, supra note 17, at 347-48.
108. KENDRICK, supra note 1, at 101.
109. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1320 (1866).
110. KENDRICK, supra note 1, at 102.
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Southern states to enfranchise the newly freed slaves, the removal of
the black suffrage provision left open the possibility that state
legislatures would choose to accept a reduced presence in Congress in
preference to allowing African-Americans to the right to vote.
Southern legislatures could thereby remove the most important
political counterweight to the overwhelmingly pro-Confederate white
electorate, creating the specter not only of state legislatures
dominated by ex-Confederate sympathizers, but also of the selection
of congressional delegations and presidential electors with similar
views.
Faced with this possibility, George Boutwell quickly moved to
add a provision that would have barred most high ranking officials of
the Confederacy and all those who had joined the rebellion after
having served in either the United States military or the 36th
Congress from holding federal office in the future. This motion failed
on an 8-6 vote, as Republicans William Pitt Fessenden, Jacob
Howard, George Williams, John Bingham, and Henry Blow joined
the three Democratic members of the committee in opposition." Ira
Harris then moved to ban all of those who had "voluntarily"
participated in the rebellion from voting in federal elections until July
4th, 1870. Although Jacob Howard immediately added his vote to
those of the six Republicans who had supported Boutwell's motion,
the Harris proposal was initially one vote short of the majority
necessary for it to be added to the proposed constitutional
amendment."' However, after further discussion, James Grimes also
decided to vote for the Harris proposal, and it carried by a margin of
85113
It was at this stage that John Bingham re-entered the fray, once
again pressing for the adoption of a provision including the privileges
or immunities, due process and equal protection clauses. However,
unlike his previous efforts to include the race neutral language in
addition to the civil rights clause in the Owen amendment, on April
28th Bingham moved to replace the prohibition on race
discrimination with his preferred formulation. This time he was
successful; although Jacob Howard, John Grimes and Justin Morrill
demurred, Bingham's motion carried on a vote of 10-3.11 The same
day, with only committee Democrats dissenting, the proposed
111. Id. at 104.
112. Id. at 105.
113. Id. at 105-06.
114. Id. at 106-07.
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constitutional amendment was sent to the full House and Senate for
action."5
While Bingham himself had consistently pressed for inclusion of
race-blind language in the constitutional amendment, the motivation
of the other members of the Joint Committee who chose to vote for
this substitution is less immediately apparent. On its face, the actions
of those who opposed Bingham on April 25th but supported him on
April 28th are particularly puzzling. However, a plausible rationale
for their change of heart emerges fairly clearly when one considers
the alteration of section one against the backdrop of the committee's
contemporaneous action on the section dealing with the basis of
representation.
On its face, the formulation of section two that was ultimately
adopted by the Joint Committee might be viewed as something of a
compromise between the language from the Owen plan (that
mirrored the formulation that had been defeated in the Senate the
month before) and proposals to base representation directly on the
number of voters in each state. But in addition, the new language
assuaged at least some of the concerns that had been voiced by
Charles Sumner in connection with the race-focused provision that
was rejected in the Senate. As already noted, Sumner strongly
supported the adoption of a constitutional amendment that would
have directly prohibited racial discrimination in voting rights. But in
the alternative, he took the view that the Grimes formulation that was
adopted by the Joint Committee on April 28th was superior to the
race-specific language that had originally been reported for three
reasons: First, it "is not open to any evasions; in the second place, it
contains no words which can imply any recognition of inequality of
rights; and in the third place, it contains no words which can imply
any recognition of any right of a state to disfranchise on account of
race or color. 11 6 Similarly, James Garfield recalled several years
later, "in the spirit of a similar criticism made by Madison... that the
word 'servitude' or 'slavery' ought not to be named in the
Constitution as existing or as exercising any influence in the suffrage;
and hence this negative form was adopted to avoid the use of an
unpleasant word. 117 In addition, Thaddeus Stevens had made a
related point in connection with the dispute over African-American
suffrage, observing that some Republicans had told him that "[t]hey
115. Id. at 114.
116. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1321 (1866).
117. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 82 (1871).
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were afraid that if [the amendment mentioned African-Americans] at
all, it would be used against them as an electioneering handle."'' 8
However, the change in the language of section two did not
entirely resolve the problem to which Garfield referred. Even after
the alteration of the provision on the basis of representation, the
"unpleasant word" remained in section one. The adoption of the
Bingham language eliminated this difficulty thereby creating an
amendment that was, at least on its face, entirely race-blind.
Against this background, the decision to change the formulation
of sections one is best understood as being part of a larger effort to
alter the rhetorical message conveyed by the Fourteenth Amendment
as a whole. As already noted, taken as a whole, the language of the
original Owen proposal by its terms implicitly conveyed the message
that Republicans viewed treatment of the ex-slaves as the central
issue in the conflict over Reconstruction. By contrast, by adopting
the race-blind Bingham language in its stead, Republicans could
plausibly claim that their concerns transcended race and extended to
the fair treatment of the populace more generally.
In fact, in this regard, the impact of the changes in the wording of
sections one and two seem to have had only a limited effect on the
legislative debate over the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
All parties to the political dispute over reconstruction policy
understood that, while Republicans had concerns about the treatment
of Unionists in the South, the question of the status of the ex-slaves
was one of the issues that was at the heart of the problem. The
discussions of section one on the floor of the House of
Representatives and the Senate clearly reflected this reality.
V. Discussions of Section One
A. Discussions in Congress
While sections two and three of the proposed Fourteenth
Amendment generated far more discussion in both the House of
Representatives and the Senate, Democrats also launched a variety of
attacks on section one, arguing that this provision was primarily
designed to protect the rights of African-Americans and would
unduly infringe upon the authority of the state governments."9
Conversely, Republicans were united in their support of section one.
118. Owen, supra note 97, at 666.
119. E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2501 (remarks of Rep. Shanklin)
(section one strikes down "reserved rights of the states" and would "invest all power in the
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Thaddeus Stevens' explanation of the impact of section one
reflected the viewpoint of many Republicans. After referring to the
provisions of the Black Codes which prohibited African-Americans
from testifying in court and imposed heavier penalties on African-
Americans for crimes, Stevens asserted that "[u]nless the
Constitution should restrain them [the ex-Confederate] states will all,
I fear, keep up this discrimination, and crush the hated freedmen."'' 0
Similarly, responding to the claim that there was no need for section
one because the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided the necessary
protections, Stevens noted that a statute could be repealed at any
time and observed that "I need hardly say that the first time that the
South and their copperhead allies obtain the command of Congress
[the Civil Rights Act] will be repealed. 12' Others, such as Republican
Representative John M. Broomall observed that John Bingham and
others had expressed doubts about the constitutionality of the Civil
Rights Act, and that the adoption of section one would remove those
doubts.' But in marked contrast to the heated debate over the
Bingham amendment in February, no mainstream Republican voiced
any dissatisfaction with the Joint Committee's formulation of section
one in the House of Representatives.
Unlike the proceedings in the House, the discussions in the
Senate led to one important change in the wording of section one.
Early in the debate, Republican Senator Benjamin F. Wade of Ohio
complained that the privileges and immunities clause referred to
citizens of the United States without defining that term. 3  In
response, the Senate Republican caucus voted to add the current
definition of citizenship. The change was approved by the full Senate
after an intense debate which focused on issues such as the status of
Native Americans and Chinese immigrants and the impact that the
wording of the definition would have on that status. 4
The only detailed analysis of the remainder of section one in the
Senate came from Senator Jacob Howard who served as the official
spokesman of the Joint Committee because of Fessenden's illness.
Howard had been one of the three Republicans on the Joint
General Government."), 2538 (remarks of Rep. Rogers) (section one is "an attempt to
embody in the Constitution... that outrageous and miserable civil rights bill") (1866).
120. Id. at 2459.
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122. Id. at 2498.
123. Id. at 2768.
124. Id. at 2890-97.
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Committee to vote against John Bingham's motion to replace the
original language of the Owen amendment with the tripartite race-
blind formulation. Nonetheless, Howard delivered what one
progressive commentator has described as a "stirring defense" of
section one.' After first making an effort to define the term "citizen
of the United States,"'28 Howard turned to what he described as "the
curious question.., of what are the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States."'27 Howard made no mention of race in
this context. Instead, he cited the Comity Clause, the Bill of Rights
and the other rights specifically described in the Constitution as those
which would be protected by the privileges or immunities clause of
section one."
The issue of race was featured far more prominently in Howard's
discussion of the due process and equal protection clauses. Treating
the two clauses together, he asserted that "[section one] abolishes all
class legislation and does away with the injustice of subjecting one
caste of person to a code not applicable to another."'29 Specifically
observing that the equal protection clause would prohibit racial
discrimination in sentencing and fundamental rights, Howard asked
rhetorically "[i]s it not time.., that we extend to the black man ...
the poor privilege of equal protection of the law?"'30 He concluded
his discussion of section one by emphatically denying that section one
would place any restrictions on state authority over voting rights.'
Other than the debate over the definition of citizenship, section
one generated almost no other comments in the Senate.'32 But the
very lack of criticism from more mainstream Republicans in either
the Senate or the House of Representatives was itself an important
indicator of their view of the scope of section one. As we have
already seen, conservative Republicans had vociferously attacked the
Bingham amendment when it had come before the House of
Representatives in February. Further, Republicans in general had
125. GARRETT EPPs, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 234 (2006).
126. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2765-66.
129. Id. at 2766.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Brief exceptions can be found at id. at 3041 (remarks of Sen. Johnson); app.
219-20 (remarks of Sen. Howe), app. 240 (remarks of Sen. Davis).
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shown no qualms in criticizing the language of the other provisions of
the constitutional amendment reported by the Joint Committee,
successfully arguing for not only the addition of the citizenship clause
to section one, but also important changes in the language of sections
two, three and four. Against this background, the failure to interpose
any criticism to the invocation of the concepts of privileges and
immunities, equal protection and due process can only be viewed as
an indication that Republicans in general believed that Bingham's
change in the wording of the equal protection clause had obviated the
potential ambiguity that some had found so objectionable in the
original Bingham amendment.
But in any event, the approval of the revised Fourteenth
Amendment by Congress in June 1866, did not end the public debate
over the meaning of the amendment. As already noted, the
amendment was designed to outline the program of reconstruction
that Republicans would put before the voters in the midterm
elections of 1866. Thus, during the election campaign, much of the
campaign rhetoric from both sides focused on the terms of the
amendment. Not surprisingly, in making their political arguments,
Republicans and Democrats expressed very different views about the
desirability and implications of section one.
B. Discussions of Section One During the Political Campaign
In making the case in favor of section one of the Fourteenth
Amendment during the summer and fall of 1866, Republicans often
sought to exploit the rhetorical advantage provided by the decision to
abandon the original Owen proposal in favor of race-neutral
language. To be sure, Republicans at times acknowledged that
section one was designed to protect the ex-slaves from racial
discrimination. For example, the New York Times cited a state court
decision that upheld a North Carolina law which prohibited African-
Americans from owning guns as an illustration of the need for the
constitutional amendment.'33 But at the same time, Republicans also
emphasized the universality of the guarantees embodied in section
one. Thus, Republican Representative Schulyer Colfax of Indiana
declared that the proposed amendment required that "the civil rights
of all persons, born or naturalized, shall be maintained"''M while the
New Hampshire Statesman asserted that section one would "insure
133. N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 28, 1866, at 4.
134. BANGOR WHIG AND COURIER, July 17,1866, Issue 13, at col. C.
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the citizenship of all persons whatever, born or naturalized, in this
country." '135 Republican Governor Richard C. Oglesby of Illinois was
more expansive, contending that, by virtue of the amendment:
I am a citizen of Illinois, to-day-tomorrow I can go to
Missouri [and] the moment I plant my foot on that
free soil, I am a citizen of Missouri... My country
goes along with me, and wherever I put my foot on
American soil, in any state, I am entitled to all the
privileges, immunities and rights of a citizen of that
state. It is for this that I love the Union.
136
For their part, the critics of the Fourteenth Amendment attacked
section one from two different angles. Despite the Republican
decision to strip the amendment of explicit references to racial
discrimination, some continued to emphasize the relationship
between section one and African-American rights. Thus, for
example, the Richmond Whig characterized section one as an integral
part of an effort to achieve "negro equality in all respects."
But at the same time, the race-neutral formulation also left
Republicans open to the familiar charge that section one would vastly
expand the scope of federal power. For example, in a widely
circulated letter, Orville H. Browning, the Secretary of Interior in the
Johnson administration, asserted that the due process clause in
particular would "annihilate totally the independence and sovereignty
of State judiciaries in the administration of State laws," providing the
federal courts with license to intervene not only in criminal cases
involving issues such as larceny and murder, but also in civil suits as
mundane as disputes over the ownership of a pig.137 Faced with such
charges, Republicans at times again reverted to the concept of unjust
classifications, with the New York Commercial Advertiser asserting
that the due process clause was intended to be a "reference to the
rights of the freedmen,"138 while the Daily Cleveland Herald
specifically referred to the Black Codes and also observed more
generally that "[i]f the State passes a law that a negro, a Yankee or an
Irishman shall have his pig taken from him because he is a negro, a
135. NEW HAMPSHIRE STATESMAN, July 27, 1866, Issue 2356, at col. C.
136. WISCONSIN STATE REGISTER, July 14, 1866, Issue 18, at col. D.
137. Browning's letter is reproduced in the DAILY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct.
24, 1866, at 2.
138. NEW YORK COMMERCIAL ADVERTISER, Oct. 24, 1866, at 2.
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Yankee or an Irishman... then he can appeal to the Federal Courts
under the [proposed due process clause].'1 39
In any event, the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment as a
whole by congressional Republicans ultimately served its political
purpose. With the amendment as the basis of its platform, the party
won a landslide victory in the elections of 1866, further cementing its
hold on both houses of Congress. By contrast, as a Reconstruction
proposal, the amendment was initially a failure. With the exception
of Tennessee, the governments of the ex-Confederate states at first
steadfastly refused to ratify the amendment, even at the cost of
continuing to remain unrepresented in Congress. Ultimately,
however, more pliant state governments were established under the
aegis of the Reconstruction Acts of 1867, paving the way for the
ratification of the amendment by the requisite number of state
legislatures.'
Conclusion
Placing the debate over the Fourteenth Amendment in the
context of the larger dispute over Reconstruction policy provides
important insights into a variety of issues related to the amendment.
In purely historical terms, the broader focus clarifies the role that was
played by John Bingham in the development of section one.
Bingham was not solely or even primarily responsible for advancing
the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment should explicitly provide
constitutional protections for civil rights. Indeed, by the time that he
first took such a position in the deliberations of the Joint Committee,
mainstream Republicans generally were committed to that view.
Instead, Bingham's unique contribution to the evolution of section
one derived from his insistence that the amendment should include
race-neutral language either in addition to or instead of simply
prohibiting racial discrimination.
Bingham's success in persuading a majority of the members of
the Joint Committee to accept this position creates something of a
dilemma for those seeking to divine the original meaning of section
one. The decision to reject the Owen language in favor of the current
tripartite formulation conclusively discredits any effort to limit the
reach of section one to racial discrimination. But at the same time,
the fact that the conservative Republicans who had condemned
139. DAILY CLEVELAND HERALD, Oct. 26, 1866, Issue 257, at col. E.
140. This process is chronicled in BENEDICT, supra note 17.
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Bingham's federal power amendment in February had no difficulty
with the version of section one that emerged from the Joint
Committee in April provides strong evidence that they did not view
the current language of section one as being susceptible to the kind of
open-ended interpretation that men such as Roscoe Conkling and
William Stewart feared might attend the adoption of the federal
power amendment.
Jacob Howard's discussion of the relationship between section
one and suffrage suggests the outlines of a partial solution to the
problem. At its climactic meeting on April 28th, the Joint Committee
made a conscious decision to remove the provision in the Owen
amendment that would have banned racial discrimination in voting
rights. The import of this decision was intended to be at least as
definitive as the choice to adopt race-blind language in section one.
Nonetheless, Howard recognized the possibility that some might
contend that section one could easily be interpreted to provide some
federal protection for the right to vote. Anticipating this argument,
Howard asserted that "section one does not give [anyone] the right of
voting. The right of suffrage is not, in law, one of the privileges or
immunities secured by the Constitution .... It is merely the creature
of law. It has always been regarded in this country as the result of
positive local law, not regarded as one of [the] fundamental rights
lying at the basis of all society.,
14 1
While unclear at the margins, the distinction between rights
explicitly guaranteed by the federal Constitution and "fundamental
rights lying at the basis of all society" on one hand and rights which
are "the result of local law" potentially establishes a workable
framework to limit the scope of the interests that are protected by the
terms of section one. By contrast, Howard's discussion of
classification issues was far more amorphous. Like other
Republicans, on this question Howard focused on the concepts of
"class legislation" and discrimination on the basis of "caste."'' 2 While
evocative, on their face these terms do not provide concrete standards
for distinguishing permissible from impermissible classifications. For
originalists, this problem is the most enduring legacy of John
Bingham's victory in the Joint Committee on Reconstruction.
141. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).
142. Id.
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